Strategic Studies Institute

Transforming to Effects-based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom Experience Strategic Studies Institute

Publisher Marketing: Outside the United States, the United Kingdom (UK) has led the way in seeking to transform its military forces to meet the new strategic context in which it finds itself. Like so many of its counterparts, it has sought to do this within a defense budget that has continued to decline as a percentage of gross domestic product. This has meant a series of changes to the traditional approach to defense that have gone much further than the United States and many of its European counterparts. In essence, for good or ill, the UK has pushed ahead with changes to areas such as the use of contractors, both at home and on the battlefield; acquisition reform involving leasing and Public- Private Partnerships; the disposal of surplus defense real estate; and the role of sponsored reserves. As the same time, a considerable amount of attention has been given to how operations are conducted. As part of this process, the UK's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces have officially sought to adopt an effects-based approach to operations within the context of an overall "comprehensive approach" that brings together the various organs of government. For the United States, the UK's approach to military operations is important for a number of reasons. First, the UK frequently engages in a variety of similar type operations from which there are lessons that may be applicable to the United States either now or in the future, such as counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland or nation-building in Sierra Leone. Moreover, a number of authors have argued that there is a distinctly "British way in warfare" which is particularly suited to such unconventional operations. Second, since the United Kingdom is one of the United States' closest allies, the UK armed forces are frequently engaged in operations in partnership with the United States. These have ranged recently from the Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq. In fact, the only noticeable time the British were not involved in a U. S.-led operation since the end of the Cold War was in Somalia. The vast majority of these operations have involved sizable British commitments and a close integration of the British military in all the stages from planning through to nation-building. Interest in future British policy was most recently evident in the debate surrounding the transition of power from Prime Minister Tony Blair to Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Third, the UK is a member of various military alliances, coalitions, and partnerships which place it in a strong position to influence how others conduct operations. These include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the European Union (EU); America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (ABCA); the Five Power Pact in the Pacific; and the Commonwealth. In the case of NATO, it was General David Richards, the commander of the largely British Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) headquarters, who deployed to Afghanistan in 2006 and oversaw the expansion of NATO's role, including, for the first time since the end of World War II, leading a significant U. S. contingent. This study therefore seeks to examine the extent to which the UK has transitioned to effects-based operations to ascertain (1) areas where the U. S. Army could draw lessons from UK policies; (2) areas where the U. S. Army and the British Ministry of Defense could develop integrated or complementary approaches and doctrines towards transformation for future alliance/ coalition operations; and (3) implications for the U. S. Army for working with the UK.