Dennis C Dimengo

Light Infantry Division and Counterguerrllla Operations: Organizational Fit or Mismatch? Dennis C Dimengo

Publisher Marketing: This monograph examines the suitability of the US Army Light Infantry Division's division-base structure to execute counterguerrilla doctrine. Since the adoption of AirLand Battle doctrine by the US Army in 1982, there has been an Increasing call to move the US Army division base to the brigade and In essence, fix the brigade structure with its own organic combat, combat support and combat service support structure. While there has been considerable study of this proposal with regards to heavy brigades and divisions in mid-to high-intensity conflict, there has been little examination of the light Infantry division and virtually none of low-Intensity conflict. In light of this apparent void, this monograph analyzes brigade-vs. division-base organization for the light Infantry division in one type of operation that appears to be applicable to light Infantry employment across the conflict spectrum--counterguerrilla operations. The monograph first explores the nature of guerrilla operations on the modern battlefield in both conventional and Insurgency warfare. It then reviews US Army counterguerrilla doctrine in both Instances. Next, the organization and capabilities of the light Infantry division are examined. Finally, the congruence between counterguerrilla doctrine and light infantry division organization is analyzed. Additionally, the ability of the division-base organization to adapt to emerging doctrine is examined. The monograph concludes that the current light Infantry division division-base organization does support current counterguerrilla doctrine. Further, it finds that the organizational principles in the US Army's counterguerrilla doctrine accurately address the likely complexion of guerrilla warfare on the modern conventional or counterinsurgency battlefield. The monograph also concludes that the division-base organization is fully capable of adapting to emerging US Army doctrine for contingency operations or reinforcement of forward deployed forces.