Stanley J Dougherty

Defense Suppression: Building Some Operational Concepts Stanley J Dougherty

Publisher Marketing: What operational principles and concepts should be used to defeat a highly capable ground-based, strategic air defense system? This study examines the theories of Carl von Clausewitz, Basil H. Liddell Hart, Giulio Douhet, and Col John A. Warden III, and reviews United States, British, and Israeli Air Force doctrines for concepts and principles to overcome defensive strength. A historical analysis of Linebacker II, the Yom Kippur War, the 1982 Bekaa Valley Operation, and Operation Desert Storm shows the value of maneuver, surprise, and mass in sustaining offensive airpower. Four operational concepts are presented: the indirect approach (maneuver), the stealth approach (surprise), the mass simultaneous attack (mass), and a balanced concept (mass and surprise). A 28-day war game examines their operational effectiveness. The war game demonstrated the high survivability of stealth aircraft at the expense of approximately 50 percent fewer targets destroyed. The mass concept illustrated the significant damage possible when a large-scale simultaneous attack saturates an air defense system. The balanced approach proved most robust, approaching the productivity of the mass concept (number of targets destroyed) and the efficiency of the stealth concept (cost of target destroyed). This study suggests the USAF should pursue stealth, stand-off weapons, real-time intelligence, drones, Wild Weasels, and electronic warfare technologies-while balancing them with a large inventory of relatively "inexpensive" multirole aircraft.